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I.

INTRODUCTION

Scholarly and professional perceptions of the role of the
judiciary, and hence of the responsibility of judges, have undergone radical change since the early 1900's, and judicial opinions
have both reflected and been influenced by those perceptions. At
the turn of the century, conceptual abstraction and logical consistency held sway.1 Formalism, however, gave way to Legal
Realism in the 1920's and 30's. Of the many important contributions that Realism made to the way we think about law, the
most fundamental was its recognition that formal rules do not
mechanically govern the resolution of legal disputes. This
insight, however, led some theorists to the conclusion that the
role of legal standards is peripheral at best." Under this conception, the dominant factor influencing the outcome of litigation is
the personality and psychology of the individual judge. To the
practicing attorney, this meant that the key to success in litigation lay in "psyching out" the judge and designing trial tactics
to elicit the desired psychological response from the bench.
From the point of view of the judge, however, skepticism about
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Puget Sound School of Law; A.B.
Columbia College, 1965; J.D. cum laude, Fordham University School of Law, 1972;
LL.M. New York University School of Law, 1975.
1. Thus Professor Zane of the University of Michigan Law School faculty wrote in
1918:
Every judicial act resulting in a judgment consists of a pure deduction.
The figure of its reasoning is the stating of a rule applicable to certain facts, a
finding that the facts of the particular case are those certain facts and the
application of the rule is a logical necessity ....
Now it must be perfectly apparent to anyone who is willing to admit the
rules governing rational mental action that unless the rule of the major premise exists as antecedent to the ascertainment of the fact or facts put into the
minor premise, there is no judicial act in stating the judgment. The man who
claims that under our system the courts make law is asserting that the courts
habitually act unconstitutionally.
Zane, German Legal Philosophy, 16 MIcH. L. REv. 287, 338 (1918).
2. See, e.g., Frank, What Courts Do In Fact, 26 ILL. L. REv. 645 (1932).
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the relevance of legal standards was not much help. The judge
who faced a difficult choice in a close case could only conclude
that his or her personal conception of the underlying values
must be the guide.
This view was tempered in the postwar era by the concept
of "reasoned elaboration." s This concept presumably placed a
limit on judicial freedom by requiring that opinions not simply
give reasons supporting the outcome, but that they rely upon
those reasons in justifying the outcome through rational evaluation of legitimate legal standards. Contemporary jurisprudence
continues to wrestle with the problem of identifying criteria for
ascertaining judicial legitimacy in individual cases.4 Clearly, giving deference to legislative policy choice is legitimate, while acting on the basis of personal prejudice is not, yet there is a wide
gap between these extremes.
In working toward an articulation of criteria for judging the
legitimacy of legal reasoning, we should be able to find guidance
in the primary data: judicial opinions. As Herbert Wechsler
pointed out over 20 years ago, "the question [of identifying judgmental criteria is] the same one for the Court and for its critics." 5 "Good" opinions, of course, reflect legitimate use of legal
argument; however, poor opinions can be instructive as well. By
specifying why a given justification is inadequate or identifying
those concerns which were improperly taken into account as well
as those that should have been taken into account, we can begin
to generate objective criteria for judging the judges. A recent
decision of the Washington State Supreme Court provides fertile
ground for this approach.
II.

WYMAN V. WALLACE-SUMMARY

OF OPINIONS

Plaintiff brought an action for alienation of his wife's affections and obtained a judgment against the defendant in 1974.6
Two years later, the court of appeals per curiam held that the
3. See generally, White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration:Jurisprudential
Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279 (1973).
4. Professor Dworkin's jurisprudence is an attempt to solve this problem. See Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1975). A slightly altered version of this article
appears as a chapter in R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81 (1977).
5. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARv. L. Rev. 1,
11 (1959).
6. Wyman v. Wallace, No. 747557 (Super. Ct. King County, Wash., filed Jan. 18,
1974).
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action for alienation of affection of a spouse was abolished.' In
1979, the supreme court reversed the court of appeals in a five to
four decision, but granted reconsideration.8 Upon reconsideration in 1980, the court vacated its prior decision and affirmed
the court of appeals' abolition of interspousal "rights" to
"affection." 9
The court of appeals based the abolition of the cause of
action on several policy grounds which were summarized by the
majority opinion in Wyman II as follows:
The Court of Appeals explained that the action should
be eliminated for the following reasons: (1) The underlying
assumption of preserving marital harmony is erroneous; (2)
The judicial process is not sufficiently capable of policing the
often vicious out of court settlements; (3) The opportunity for
blackmail is great since the mere bringing of an action could
ruin a defendant's reputation; (4) There are no helpful standards for assessing damages; and (5) The successful plaintiff
succeeds in compelling what appears to be a forced sale of the
spouse's affections."0
The majority in Wyman I was not persuaded by the lower
court's reliance on these factors because in its view they lacked
evidentiary support: "Judicial abolition of a long-standing cause
of action, however, should be supported by clear reasons and an
' In the absence thereof, "any determinaevident factual basis." 11
tion to abolish the action for alienation of a spouse's affections
as an anachronism incompatible with contemporary mores or
opinion, should be made by the legislature."1 '
The majority opinion in Wyman I also responded to
Wyman's reliance on two recent Washington statutes: The Dissolutions of Marriage Act 1 and the Equal Rights Act.1" With
regard to the Dissolution Act, the court stated that while it
"made sweeping changes in the law regarding the relationship
between spouses.

. .

it did not purport to modify the rights of a

7. Wyman v. Wallace, 15 Wash. App. 395, 549 P.2d 71 (1976).
8. Wyman v. Wallace (Wyman I), 91 Wash. 2d 317, 588 P.2d 1133 (1979).
9. Wyman v. Wallace (Wyman II), 94 Wash. 2d 99, 615 P.2d 452 (1980).
10. Id. at 105, 615 P.2d at 455.
11. Wyman I, 91 Wash. 2d at 319, 588 P.2d at 1134.
12. Id. at 320, 588 P.2d at 1135.
13. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.09.010-.290 (Supp. 1981).
14. 1973 Wash. Laws, ch. 154, 1st Ex. Sess. (codified in various chapters of WASH.
REv. CODE).
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spouse against a third party." 8 Similarly, the Equal Rights Act
was not relevant since the cause of action for alienation of affections was available to both men and women.
Subsequently, the Wyman II court identified its inherent
power to modify or abolish a common law rule in light of
changed circumstances as a justification for abrogating the cause
of action. In response to Wyman I's concern about the lack of
evidence regarding the asserted policy considerations, the court
relied on its ability to "take notice of 'legislative facts'-social,
economic, and scientific facts that 'simply supply premises in
the process of legal reasoning' ....
Under this doctrine a court
can take notice of scholarly works, scientific studies and social
facts."1 6 Asserting the appropriateness of relying upon such "legislative facts" when rendering a policy grounded decision, the
opinion stated that the court of appeals "based its decision on
judicial notice of the realities of a marital relationship." Further
quoting from the court of appeals' decision, the supreme court
affirmed that " 'a viable marriage is not one where the "mental
attitude" of one spouse towards the other is susceptible to interference by an outsider.' ,,17 After citing a United States Supreme
Court decision' 8 and a Washington Supreme Court decision' as
authority for taking judicial notice of such social facts, the opinion ended with the above quoted listing of policy reasons relied
upon by the court of appeals.
III.

WYMAN V. WALLACE-EVALUATION

Both the substantive issue and the case's procedural posture
raise questions relating to the legitimate modes of substantive
justification for court decisions and to the appropriate role of
the judiciary in our system of government. The determinative
nature of social policy issues in a decision to abolish the common
law action for alienation of affections highlights the borderline
between appropriate judicial resolution of individual controversies and inappropriate judicial legislation on broad social policy
issues. The confusing procedural history of the Wyman case represents a failure of substantive consistency in judicial decisions.
15.
16.
17.
73-74).
18.
19.

Wyman 1, 91 Wash. 2d at 321, 588 P.2d at 1135.
Wyman II, 94 Wash. 2d at 102, 615 P.2d at 454 (citations omitted).
Id. at 104, 615 P.2d at 455 (quoting Wyman I, 15 Wash. App. at 400, 549 P.2d at
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 500 P.2d 771 (1972).
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Initially, these two issues will be analyzed separately, although,
as will appear, questions of substance and questions of process
ultimately cannot be resolved independently of one another.
A.

Wyman II and the Judicial Process

The doctrine of stare decisis reflects professional concern
for consistency in resolutions of similar legal issues. Consistency,
however, is not an end in itself, but a reflection of more fundamental social values. The maxim "treat like cases alike," for
example, requires judicial consistency, but reflects a conception
of justice which assumes that all persons are equal before the
law. Similarly, our commitment to a "government of laws, and
not of men" 20 requires that judicial decisions be based upon
legal standards rather than upon the personal preferences of
individual judges. Thus, while stare decisis may serve professional and internal institutional purposes, its fundamental
importance derives from its serving broader social goals. Whenever a court considers a major departure from established doctrine, it should weigh carefully the effect of such a departure on
these underlying goals and purposes in addition to evaluating
the substantive issue before it. The underlying interests include
equality of litigants, public reliance upon existing laws, stability
in legal standards, judicial efficiency, and public confidence in
the system of justice.2 1 While equality and reliance relate to the
accomplishment of justice in individual cases, stability and efficiency are concerned with the ongoing administration of justice
through time. The image of justice can be affected at both levels.
Equality, which is central to our notion of justice, requires
that similarly situated litigants be accorded similar treatment.
Differences in treatment can only be justified on the basis of
legally relevant factors. A litigant whose claim is legally identical
with one that was adjudicated yesterday has a right to expect
that his claim will be decided the same way today. On the other
hand, factual identity ought not to be controlling where the
prior claim was adjudicated in a long past era on the basis of
20. See MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XXX:
In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall
never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them: the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them:
the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers or either
of them: to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men.
21. See L. CARTER, REASON IN LAw 37-39 (1979).
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presently obsolete underlying values. Such, arguably, was the
case in Wyman.' Fundamental changes in social attitudes and
values often provide the justification for not applying outdated
legal doctrines, and an argument for "equal treatment" in that
context is merely an appeal to formalism.
Public reliance on pre-existing law, however, is also protected by stare decisis. As in the case of equality, however, a
party's reliance must be substantial and not merely formal. In
property and commercial transactions, for example, actions are
consciously undertaken with regard to attaining a particular
legal result and reliance upon the recognized means of doing so
must be respected.'3 On the other hand, torts is an area of law
largely designed to provide redress for harm resulting from conduct undertaken without conscious attempt to achieve a particular legal result. Actual or theoretical reliance on pre-existing
doctrine in many cases is simply nonexistent. For example, it is
difficult to imagine that the plaintiff in Wyman conducted his
marital relationship in reliance on the expectation of judicially
coerced reparations should he lose his wife's affections to
another man. Furthermore, courts should hold litigants to constructive notice of our legal system's socially responsive nature,
and, therefore, disregard reliance on a formal rule where generally recognized contemporary values contradict its continued
viability.
Equality and reliance, then, do not require adherence to
prior law in Wyman because the plaintiff cannot justifiably
assert those interests in the circumstances of this case. At the
institutional level, however, the decision in this case has ignored
stare decisis' remaining purposes: doctrinal stability and judicial
efficiency.
Stability in the law is clearly in society's interest. While a
high level of predictability incidentally facilitates the attorney's
work, stability's primary purposes must be justified in terms of
the client's interests. Accordingly, judicial consistency serves the
client's interests by bringing a socially desirable degree of continuity to the fulfillment of justiciable expectations arising out
of interpersonal relationships. This factor argues against the
decision in Wyman IL In Wyman I, the supreme court refused
22. See notes 33-44 infra and accompanying text for the analysis of the substantive
issue in this case.
23. See, e.g., Crowley v. Lewis, 239 N.Y. 264, 146 N.E. 374 (1925).
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to abolish the action for alienation of a spouse's affections, and
in reliance on that decision the court of appeals subsequently
refused to abolish the common law action for criminal conversation.24 In Wyman II, the supreme court vacated its prior decision and abolished the action for alienation but specifically
refused to comment on the continued viability of the related
action for criminal conversation.2 5 Besides creating legal uncertainty in a significant area of family law, this evasiveness stimulates conjectural distinction between these two realistically
inseparable torts, and thus deprives community relations of the
benefits of predictable legal regulation of social issues.
This chronology also suggests that judicial efficiency has
been sacrificed. Not only will resolving the issue of criminal conversation require subsequent appellate litigation, but further
uncertainties have been created as well. For example, the majority relied upon the court of appeals' contention that there are no
helpful standards for assessing damages.' 6 Yet as Justice Hicks
pointed out in his dissenting opinion, the gravamen of this cause
of action is interference with consortium 27 and the court had
recently held that loss of consortium may be compensable in an
action for personal injury.'8
Such inconsistencies in supreme court opinions hardly
inspire public respect for our legal institutions. Not only do they
undermine the stability and certainty which the public expects
in the law, they undermine public confidence in the judiciary.
Taking contradictory positions from case to case kindles support
for the Realist conception of judges deciding on the basis of personal preference and simply rationalizing the outcome ex post
facto. Worse yet, this is a relatively obscure point in comparison
with the remaining blows which have been dealt the image of
justice by the decision in this case.
While unusual, it is not unprecedented for a court to vacate
its own decision on rehearing. In this case, however, the vote
each time was five to four and the change in result followed the
replacement of one member of the court ." The new justice's
24. Almstrom v. Community Personal Guidance Center, 22 Wash. App. 534, 590
P.2d 370 (1979).
25. Wyman II, 94 Wash. 2d at 105 n.2, 615 P.2d at 455 n.2.
26. Id. at 105, 615 P.2d at 455.
27. Id. at 107, 615 P.2d at 456.
28. See Lundgren v. Whitney's, Inc., 94 Wash. 2d 91, 614 P.2d 1272 (1980).
29. Justice Williams replaced Justice Hamilton and joined the four judges who were
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vote transformed the original minority into the majority on
rehearing. Furthermore, the case was decided in the absence of a
record of the trial court proceedings, 0 and on the basis of the
briefs which had been submitted to the court of appeals and
simply re-submitted to the supreme court in Wyman L
Standing alone, none of these factors would be decisive
against the court's abolishing the action for alienation of affections. The court might appropriately have done so in Wyman I
on the basis of a persuasive substantive analysis.3 ' Nonetheless,
the cumulative effect of these factors in Wyman II made the
court's decision singularly inappropriate, if for no other reason
than it conveys to the public the sense that its supreme court
has asserted a right to make abstract policy choices for the citizens of Washington rather than confining itself to the orderly
resolution of legal controversies. In effect, the supreme court has
chosen to act as a legislative organ and in so doing has ignored
its basic function as a court of law by disregarding the doctrinal
goals and purposes fundamental to stare decisis.
B.

The Substantive Justification

As noted above, the court's justification for abolishing the
action for alienation of a spouse's affections consisted of three
points. The first, that the court has the inherent power to abolish a common law doctrine, is hardly conclusive of the question
whether it ought to do so in this case. The preceding discussion
of stare decisis suggests that the court ought not to have exercised that power. The court's assertion of the inherent power to
control developments in the common law, however, may have
been designed as a response to Justice Hicks' dissenting position
in the minority in Wyman I to make them the majority in Wyman II.
30. The court in Wyman II was admittedly deciding on "policy grounds," and therefore apparently was not troubled by the lack of a trial record. Wyman II, 94 Wash. 2d at
102-05, 615 P.2d at 454-55. One wonders, however, whether different policies might be
relevant to different factual circumstances. Might it be relevant, for example, whether
defendant had knowledge of the marriage? Whether the spouses were living together or
had separated? Whether defendant was motivated by malice against the plaintiff?
Whether defendant was a paramour as opposed to a close relative of the alienated
spouse? Inasmuch as the court asserted the right to make an abstract policy choice without the benefit of factual evidence, one wonders why they did not decide to abolish the
action for criminal conversation as well. Ironically, on that issue the court appealed to
the principle of judicial restraint by observing that this case "does not present [that]
analogous question." Id. at 105 n.2, 615 P.2d at 455 n.2.
31. See, notes 33-44 infra and accompanying text.
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that the court should defer this choice to the legislature. If so, it
nonetheless misses the point that the issue is not whether the
court can abolish, but whether it ought to. Furthermore, Justice
Hicks' concern stemmed from the lack of a trial record. His position can thus be summarized as reflecting his conception of the
appropriate role of the court: the court ought not abolish the
cause of action in the absence of a trial record containing substantial justificatory evidence, especially if the proposed abolition is merely based upon a judgment about contemporary attitudes toward extra-marital sexual relations. In other words, the
legislature, a representative governmental body, is best equipped
to evaluate whether attitudes have in fact changed and to make
the appropriate social policy choice.
The second point urged by the majority, however, does go to
the question of evidence. Asserting that the decision in this case
is a matter of policy choice, the majority opinion relied upon the
"legislative fact" doctrine and found support for it in a prior
decision of the court, a decision of the United States Supreme
Court, and the federal and state rules of evidence. Once again,
however, the argument fails to convince because it fails to
address the salient issues: having accepted the legislative fact
doctrine, the court must specify the facts it relied upon and justify identifying those facts as "legislative facts." As Justice Stafford points out in his dissent, "The majority opinion
never
'3 2
on.
relies
it
facts'
'legislative
what
however,
explains,
It may be that the majority conceived the policy grounds
relied on by the court of appeals to be legislative facts appropriate for judicial notice. Inasmuch as these grounds constitute the
third and final justification for its decision, one would expect
some minimal evaluation of them rather than a mere listing. For
example, the opinion asserts that "the underlying assumption of
preserving marital harmony is erroneous.

33

This seems to be a

restatement of the earlier assertion of the "social fact that 'a
viable marriage is not one where the "mental attitude" of one
spouse towards the other is susceptible to interference by an
outsider.' "' This assertion raises the question of what is meant
by the term "viable marriage." Such a statement might be valid
with respect to marriages "made in heaven," but it seems ques32. Wyman II, 94 Wash. 2d at 108, 615 P.2d at 457.
33. Id. at 105, 615 P.2d at 455.
34. Id. at 104, 615 P.2d at 455 (quoting the court of appeals).
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tionable with respect to a relationship between ordinary mortals
whose daily lives include the normal stresses associated with
modern living, such as career pressures, child rearing, taxes,
inflation, and so forth. The honeymoon does end; the real issue
therefore is whether the potential deterrent effect of legal sanctions ought to be maintained in furtherance of maximizing the
opportunity for marital partners to work out difficult problems
in their relationship. If by a "viable marriage" the court refers to
one in which the partners never experience such difficulties, the
concept is purely fictional; if not, then the ramifications of the
court's decision are considerably more fundamental than the
majority opinion suggests. In either event, the point asserted by
the court hardly corresponds to the level of certainty customarily associated with the term "fact."
Ironically, abundant evidence supports the proposition that
in fact there is a public policy favoring individual freedom of
choice in this context. Objective indications suggest that the
legal system has already institutionalized a social choice not to
overtly encourage the continuation of marital relationships even
where only one partner is less than fully satisfied with it. The
most obvious indicator is the legislative adoption of "no-fault"
divorce whereby either spouse can unilaterally obtain a dissolution of marriage solely on the basis of a sworn statement that
the marriage is "irretrievably broken."' s While a single statute is
not conclusive evidence of a broad public policy, such a policy is
reflected in a number of statutory and judicial determinations
that taken together form a persuasive web of authority that
would have fully justified judicial abolition of the action for
alienation of a spouse's affections.
Of arguably greater relevance to this issue than the no-fault
divorce statute is the statutory abolition of the crime of adultery. 6 While the act of intercourse by a third party with one's
spouse is directly actionable under the tort of criminal conversation, 7 such conduct may rationally be presumed to have
occurred where the spouse's affections have been alienated to a
35. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.09.030 (Supp. 1981).
36. WASH. REv. CODE § 9.79.110 was repealed by 1975 Wash. Laws, ch. 260, 1st Ex.

Sess.
37. See Almstrom v. Community Personal Guidance Center, 22 Wash. App. 534, 590
P.2d 370 (1979). The Almstrom court held criminal conversation to be a viable cause of
action on the authority of Wyman I.
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paramour.3 8 On this assumption the abolition of the crime of
adultery appears to be relevant; standing alone, however, it too
is inconclusive. On the one hand, one might speculate that in
abolishing the crime of adultery, the legislature relied upon the
continued existence of the civil actions for alienation of affections and criminal conversation to provide the appropriate level
of deterrence. Conversely, one can argue that the judicial abolition of these civil actions would be consistent with the legislative
policy choice to abolish the crime. In the absence of an express
legislative statement in this regard, the court should initially
evaluate the controversy by examining relevant legislative and
judicial actions in analogous areas, and then strive to render a
just and consistent decision in light of that context.
Thus, while there is no evidence supporting the former position suggesting legislative reliance upon the deterrent effect of
civil actions, the latter position is supported by its consistence
with a conceptual nexus among the adoption of no-fault divorce,
the abolition of adultery by the legislature, and recent judicial
pronouncements regarding interspousal rights, privileges, and
immunities. In 1980, the United States Supreme Court overturned the privilege against adverse spousal testimony in the
federal courts, holding that such testimony is permissible if the
witness spouse chooses to testify.3 9 Again, the rational presumption is that such testimony would tend to undermine any marital
harmony which may exist, yet the right of the spouse to make
that choice has now been established. Similarly, this right is
reflected in the Supreme Court's holding that spousal consent to
abortion may not be legislatively mandated 40 and in the Washington Supreme Court's abolition of the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity.4 1
The latter holding illustrates the importance of principled
38. This was apparently the case in Wyman, although the various opinions do not
reveal the underlying factual circumstances. It should be pointed out that the action for
alienation of a spouse's affections frequently is brought against intermeddling relatives.
See Bearhouser v. Merry, 266 N.W. 2d 128 (Iowa 1978) (refusing to abolish the cause of
action for alienation of affections); W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 876
(4th ed. 1971).
39. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980). The court in Trammel relied
on the "legislative fact" that "[w]hen one spouse is willing to testify against the other in
criminal proceeding-whatever the motivation-their relationship is almost certainly in
disrepair .
Id. at 52.
I..."
40. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
41. Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 500 P.2d 771 (1972).
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consistency in our conception of legitimate judicial decision
making. While one might rationally speculate that removing the
bar to interspousal tort recovery permits compensation for
spousally caused injury through liability insurance, this would
not be a legitimate reason for the decision. The irrelevance of
insurance protection reflects our commitment to the principle of
fault as the basis for liability in tort, and our belief that
financial status is irrelevant to the issue of fault. Conversely, the
42
court did expressly recognize the individuality of each spouse
and relied upon the argument that if litigation threatened their
relationship, they alone had the responsibility to choose.4' Having enunciated these principles, the court must be expected to
consider them in other cases to which they are relevant. Their
relevance to the issue in Wyman is clear, although their conclusiveness is not. Nonetheless, when considered together with the
previously discussed legislative and judicial indications of public
policy respecting the right to freedom of choice in the context of
a marital relationship, it appears that the requirement of principled consistency fully supports the abolition of alienation of
affections. Furthermore, viewing the issue in this perspective
reveals that, contradictory as it seems, consistency in this case
mandates change. The contradiction is dispelled, however, by
the fact that the formal rule which permitted the action for
alienation of affections had become inconsistent with prevailing
public policy.
Thus, while principled consistency supports the result in
Wyman II, the majority opinion fails to justify the result on that
basis. Furthermore, the court's shotgun approach has left several
important matters open to serious doubt. As pointed out above,
the opinion includes among its reasons for abolishing the action
that there are no helpful standards for assessing damages, yet
the court recently held that interference with rights of consortium may be compensable in an action for personal injury."
Does Wyman cast doubt upon that holding? Principled consistency would suggest that if such damages are too speculative to
provide a useful standard in one case, they ought to be similarly
regarded in others. To the extent that the court does not so
regard their stated reasons, the very concept of stare decisis is
42. Id. at 185-87, 500 P.2d at 773-74.
43. Id. at 187, 500 P.2d at 774.
44. Lundgren v. Whitney's Inc., 94 Wash. 2d 91, 614 P.2d 1272 (1980).
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thrown into doubt. It is in this regard that one ultimately cannot
maintain the analytical distinction between a court's substantive
reasoning and the question of its appropriate institutional role:
an appellate court simply ought not to render a decision for
which it is unable to articulate a principled justification that it
will stand by in future decisions. Failure to articulate a principled justification will result in a decision that fails to achieve
legitimacy either because its reasoning is faulty or because it is
based upon premises which do not address the factors which
ought to be controlling. Either way, the image of justice is tarnished and the nightmare of Realism45 comes a step closer to
reflecting the reality of contemporary judicial behavior.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This evaluation of Wyman v. Wallace has not attempted to
analyze the doctrine of alienation of affections from the point of
view of its substantive role in the field of domestic relations law.
Instead, it has focused upon the procedural posture of the case
and the reasoning by which the majority opinion supports the
result. The former aspect of Wyman suggests that the court
ought not to have undertaken to render this decision whatever
the substantive merits. The latter analysis reveals the inadequacy of the court's substantive justification and goes on to
argue that a sound argument does nevertheless support the
result.
While a single case study cannot provide the basis for a
comprehensive theory, the analysis of Wyman does suggest two
analytically distinguishable, though substantively interrelated,
general criteria. A threshold requirement that applies whenever
a fundamental change in legal doctrine is being made is that the
court evaluate the costs and benefits in terms of the purposes
served by the doctrine of stare decisis and of the appropriate
role of the judiciary in establishing public policy. The second
fundamental requirement revealed by the analysis is that of
principled consistency. There are two aspects to this concept. On
the one hand, a court should not rest its opinion on policies or
principles it is unwilling to apply in future decisions. On the
other hand, policies and principles that are relied upon must be
shown to fit consistently into the general body of legal standards
45. See Hart, American JurisprudenceThrough English Eyes: The Nightmare and
the Noble Dream, 11 GA. L. Rav. 969 (1977).
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established in legislative enactments and prior judicial pronouncements. Observance of this criterion will not eliminate
uncertainty regarding the outcome of particular cases, but it will
contribute to enhanced predictability in the law through the
articulation of trends and policy directions that will guide the
resolution of future decisions.
Public confidence in the law must ultimately be based upon
the perception that legal decisions are reached through rational
processes that transcend the personal biases and prejudices of
the individuals sitting on the bench.

